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Foreword
New Zealand’s population is in a period of rapid change, 
with implications for the economy, social cohesion, the 
place of Māori, education, and health. Auckland is now 
one of the most diverse cities in the world, and there 
are features of our demography that are unique globally.
One of the Royal Society’s functions is to promote 
informed discussion on topics of national significance. 
The 2013 census provides an ideal opportunity to 
achieve a better understanding of the changing nature 
of New Zealand society. A group of experts was 
therefore invited to produce an interdisciplinary review 
of the state of knowledge about New Zealand’s 
changing population. This review has drawn upon a 
large network of scholars from throughout the country.
Underpinning the review have been the results of  
the 2013 census. There are many issues about 
management of the census, including how the cost 
of disseminating the available detail should be 
divided between cost-recovery charges and public 
expenditure funded by taxpayers. Statistics New 
Zealand has struck a balance by making data and 
expertise available and providing access to anonymised 
records in data laboratories (assuming plans to make 
these available to accredited researchers throughout 
the country are realised).
I would like to thank Professor Gary Hawke for so ably 
chairing the review, as well as the other authors for 
giving freely of their time and expertise. We also thank 
Professor Graham Hugo for his peer review. I believe 
this report will be of interest to anyone who cares 
about the future of New Zealand, and I would love 
to see it in the hands (or on the screens) not only of 
decision-makers but also of the Year 13 students who 
will be our future leaders.
Sir David Skegg FRSNZ 
President, Royal Society of New Zealand
Authors of this Review
Professor Gary Hawke FRSNZ (Chair)
Professor Richard Bedford FRSNZ
Dr Tahu Kukutai
Dr Malcolm McKinnon
Professor Erik Olssen FRSNZ
Professor Paul Spoonley FRSNZ
Review secretariat
Richard Meylan
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Diversity | PAGE 6
• New Zealand has always had minority communities 
– both ethnic and religious – but in the last twenty 
years, the country has become diverse in new ways: 
increasing migration from Asia and an increasing 
proportion of the population born overseas.
• The implication for New Zealand is that it is, 
increasingly, a country with multiple cultural 
identities and values.
Population change | PAGE 9
• People are living and staying active longer, and the 
proportion of the population in the older age groups 
will increase.
• The implications for New Zealand are that people 
will need income for longer, and keeping the birth 
rate above replacement level will be a challenge.
Tangata whenua | PAGE 14
• Māori have a distinctive but rapidly changing 
population structure with significant assets as 
well as labour.
• Māori culture and institutions continue to endure 
and evolve along with demographic change, but the 
maintenance of te reo Māori faces challenges.
Migration | PAGE 17
• New Zealand’s population is the product of two 
long-established migration flows: immigration 
and circulation of citizens of other countries, and 
emigration and circulation of New Zealanders.
• The implications for New Zealand could include 
immigration surges from the diaspora, such as 
the 650,000 New Zealanders who live in Australia, 
and from the 23 million Australians that have right 
of access to the New Zealand labour market and 
welfare. 
• The contribution migration makes to population 
growth is likely to increase, relative to that from 
natural increase from the mid-2030’s as the gap 
between births and deaths continues to shrink with 
rising numbers of deaths and falling birth rates.
Households and families | PAGE 20
• Household patterns have changed little in the 
21st century.
• There has been a rise in two-family households, and 
many children live in households which have limited 
income and assets.
Regional variation | PAGE 23
• New Zealand is regionally diverse and interconnected, 
with Auckland accounting for over half the population 
growth between 2006 and 2013. Internal migration 
has decelerated between regions.
• The implication for New Zealand is a pattern of 
greater relative growth for Auckland, a few centres 
with slower growth, and population decline in 
much of rural New Zealand, with implications 
for maintaining service levels for an ageing and 
possibly dwindling population.
Work | PAGE 25
• Employment is shifting in terms of location and the 
rise and fall of occupations and industries. This has 
been accompanied by changes in labour supply, 
resulting in part from the ageing of the population, 
the contraction in entry level cohorts and the 
reliance on immigrant labour.
• The implications for New Zealand are that the 
growing diversity of the nature of paid employment 
will continue, so that there will be less security and 
participation will be more precarious.
Overview
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Introduction
This whakataukī, provided by Professor Sir Mason 
Durie, might be interpreted as “secure the horizons 
that are close to hand and pursue the more distant 
horizons so that they may become close”, or he 
suggests it can be put even more simply as “manage 
today and shape tomorrow”.
Census 2013 provides the occasion to reflect on the 
future implications of certain trends. Some of the 
striking findings from the 2013 census include:
• One in four people living in New Zealand in 2013 
was born in another country1
• One in five people living in New Zealand in 2013 
was born after 19992
• Many children born in the 2010s can expect to 
live into the 22nd century3
• The population was 4.2 million4, which was below  
the population expected on the basis of growth 
through natural increase and net migration between 
the censuses in 2006 and 20135
A census generates a national stock-taking. The 
Council of the Royal Society of New Zealand 
recognised an opportunity for one of its “Major Issues” 
papers to facilitate informed discussion of the state 
and prospects of New Zealand society. The Council 
appointed a Steering Panel to draft this paper, and 
assemble a much greater array of information and 
analysis which is available on the Royal Society of 
New Zealand’s website. The paper seeks to promote 
public understanding by providing a basis for a 
more informed approach to both policy debate and 
political discussion.
Not all questions about the state and prospects of 
New Zealand can best be addressed with census data. 
Whenever our enquiries lead us to questions for which 
some other data source is more useful than the census, 
we have no hesitation in using it. But the census 2013 
is central, and in a sidebar we reflect on the value of 
a national census.
Ko te pae tata, whakamaua, kia tīnā 
Ko te pae tāwhiti, whaia, kia tata.
Before Statistics New Zealand released results from the 
2013 census, the Steering Panel drew on a large number 
of researchers and sources of information about New 
Zealand society. We asked them what they considered to 
be the main trends and challenges facing New Zealand 
and, as the census results appeared, we asked them how 
their views had been changed. We supplemented the 
electronic and postal communication with workshops in 
Wellington, Hamilton, Auckland and Christchurch. We 
invited participants to provide authored commentaries 
and memoranda to be included on the website 
supporting this paper. We drew on all this material along 
with published analyses of the census and related data 
and our own analyses in preparing this paper.
We do not purport to predict New Zealand’s future, 
or even to define distinct possible futures or scenarios. 
We seek to define key features of the evolving New 
Zealand society, the pressures for change generated 
either overseas or within New Zealand, and what 
challenges these pose. We therefore do not have a 
single horizon; rather, we look at what exists, what 
is causing change, and what responses are likely, all 
with variable time-scales.
The steering panel identified key themes emerging 
from the census data and analyses. They have 
many inter-connections but they provide a framework 
for our discussion.
• Diversity
• Population change
• Tangata whenua
• Migration
• Households and families
• Regional variation
• Work
A final section distils the findings from these  
seven themes.
One in four people living in New Zealand in 2013 
was born in another country1
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The Census
The 2013 interruption to the quinquennial (five-yearly) 
pattern provides an occasion to consider the UN 
standard of censuses every ten years alongside the 
particular characteristics of New Zealand which make 
a more frequent census desirable.
Enumerating the people and other features of societies 
has a long history, but the modern census is usually 
traced to eighteenth century Europe and North 
America. Now there is an international standard: a 
decennial national census managed to a large extent 
according to a United Nations template.6
The census emerged in New Zealand in the nineteenth 
century.7 After some irregularity from 1857 to 1878, 
from 1881 a pattern of quinquennial censuses was set, 
which was interrupted only by the Great Depression 
(no census in 1931), the Second World War (none in 
1941), and the Canterbury earthquake in 2011. Less 
significantly, the ‘1946’ census was carried out in 1945, 
to allow for an electoral redistribution before the 1946 
election. The delayed timing of the 2013 census will 
bedevil analysts for many years although it is not 
difficult to allow for an inter-censal period of seven 
rather than five years.
It is not easy or cheap to ensure that a census is 
genuinely comprehensive. Statistics New Zealand 
has an enviable record of securing compliance with 
census requirements, but the coverage is never 
perfect. Moreover, there can be little direct checking 
for accuracy. Census information on incomes, for 
example, will never be as precise as Inland Revenue 
Department data. Finally, for the census form to be 
tolerable to most people, it cannot be long or complex.
There is always competition for ‘space’ in the census 
schedule. What for example is the optimal balance 
between continuity and change? Statisticians, economic 
historians and other social analysts are interested in the 
long run. On the other hand, lobbies – often vocal – call 
for more data on current issues and for new data on 
emerging issues. All this has to be done within a 
schedule of acceptable length. Devising the wording  
of questions is a sophisticated art in itself.
Some countries now rely less or not at all on a census, 
reckoning that the information they require is more 
readily and economically available from customised 
surveys and administrative data. The tools of modern 
data management make administrative data far 
more competitive with a national census. The more 
immediate uses of data management tools will be 
in the development of an e-census. The 2018 New 
Zealand Census will aim for 70 percent of forms being 
completed online – twice the 2013 online rate.
It is unlikely that the census will become redundant  
in New Zealand. Firstly, it is an important ‘anchor’  
for periodic assessment of the accuracy of other 
sources, such as population totals measured by births, 
deaths, and migration across the border. Unlike some 
countries, New Zealand does not have a system of 
civil registration which in part substitutes for census 
information. Secondly, New Zealand has a centralised 
system of government, and we use the national census 
for purposes which in other countries are the tasks 
of regional and local governments with their own 
information sources. Thirdly (in the course of preparing 
this paper, the panel became aware of this), for several 
issues the census is the only source of information. 
It is the only source of numerical information about 
iwi. Only the census provides information on places of 
residence, places of employment and means of travel. 
Assessing our transport options would be very difficult 
without a census. Linking the location of immigrants 
with their occupations and evolving skills would also 
be more difficult. In sum, the census will survive at 
least until there is a centralised system of accurate 
population and administrative data against which to pit 
the evolving range of research and policy questions.
One in five people living in New Zealand in 2013 
was born after 19992
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Subjective identity does not necessarily follow multiple 
pathways (ageing can involve settling on one rather 
than multiple identities), but the shift is still marked. For 
Pasifika populations, over 90 percent of those over 65 
identify with a single ethnicity; for those 14 and under 
it is around half.9 Given New Zealand’s historically high 
rates of intermarriage across ethnic and religious 
boundaries this pattern is typical of a wider trend and 
will almost certainly continue.
Multiple ethnicities can also mean multiple birthplaces – 
and this is the case in New Zealand in 2013. The number 
who were born overseas now equate to one in every 
four New Zealand residents10 (compared with one in five 
in 2001 and one in seven in 196111). This reflects a scale 
of immigration over the last 25 years that has not been 
seen for a century.
The 2013 census shows the diversity of these birthplaces 
and therefore the resulting range and size of ethnicities 
(and the size of these minority group ethnicities) in New 
Zealand (Figure 2). The overwhelming dominance of 
immigrants from the UK and Ireland is long gone. Since 
2011 India and China have each provided about as many 
immigrants on an annual basis as Britain; although the 
British-born population in New Zealand remains the 
largest birthplace community.12
This diversity has a significant regional dimension. The 
growth of immigrant and ethnic communities is most 
apparent in Auckland. The key feature is the fact that 
the 2013 census shows that Asian communities now 
constitute almost a quarter (23 percent) of Auckland’s 
population, much larger than the Māori population (11 
percent) or Pasifika communities (15 percent).13 These 
Asian communities will continue to grow and may 
constitute almost 30 percent of Auckland’s population 
by 2021.14 This is not too surprising given that Asia 
accounts for around 60 percent of the world’s population 
and is the closest major continent to New Zealand.
The diversity of Auckland is further reinforced by the 
fact that 39 percent of Aucklanders were born overseas. 
This makes it one of the most immigrant-dependent 
cities in the world – not as high as Toronto (46 percent 
overseas born), but much higher than many other cities 
which are often cited as cities defined by immigration.
This diversity is reflected in the range and scale of 
ethnic diversity in twenty-first century New Zealand 
(Figure 1). The 2013 census confirms the still large 
proportion of New Zealanders who define themselves 
as ‘European’ (less than three-quarters). But there has 
been a rapid growth in the numbers who are Asian, 
and at just under 12 percent of the population, these 
communities are now significantly larger than Pasifika 
communities (7.4 percent).
This growth reflects the arrival of significant numbers 
from Asia, especially from India and China. Chinese 
migrants form the largest of these communities but 
the fastest growing in the 2006 to 2013 period were 
the Indian and Filipino communities.
This adds to the diversity provided by Pasifika 
communities. While the majority of Pacific peoples in 
New Zealand are now New Zealand-born, immigration 
continues to supplement these communities, and 
when combined with relatively high levels of fertility, 
they constitute an important feature of New Zealand, 
especially in places such as South Auckland and Porirua.
The number reporting Māori ethnicity in the census 
has grown more slowly in the 2006–2013 period than 
it did in the previous inter-censal period, but that still 
means that just under 15 percent of New Zealanders 
self-identify as Māori.
New Zealand’s diversity has been 
compounded by the increasing 
prevalence of multiple ethnic 
identifications. The change is very 
noticeable when older and younger 
age groups are compared.
In 2013, 88 percent of the population 65 and over 
identified with European ethnicity, compared with just 
under 13 percent who identified with Māori, Pasifika 
or Asian ethnicity. But whereas 71 percent of the 
population who were 14 and under identified with 
European ethnicity, 24 percent identified with Māori, 
13 percent with Pasifika, and 12 percent with Asian 
ethnicity.8
Diversity
New Zealand has always had minority communities – 
both ethnic and religious – but in the last twenty years the 
country has become diverse in new ways. This has been 
underlined in the 2013 census.
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Figure 1: Population of major ethnic groups1
2006 and 2013 Census. Source: Statistics New Zealand
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Figure 2: Birthplace for the overseas born usually resident population
2001, 2006 and 2013 Census. Source: Statistics New Zealand
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New Zealand has 
always been an 
ethnically diverse 
society, but in the 
last twenty years the 
country has become 
diverse in new ways: 
increasing migration 
from Asia and a 
growing proportion 
of the population 
born overseas.
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The other New Zealand city that is beginning to show 
the effects of significant immigrant arrivals, as its major 
rebuilding gets under way, is Christchurch. Almost 12 
percent of Christchurch’s overseas born population at 
the time of the 2013 census had arrived in the preceding 
two years, compared with a little over nine percent of 
Auckland’s. On the other hand, the new immigrants  
are not as ethnically diverse as Auckland’s – 28 percent 
of Christchurch’s new migrants came from the United 
Kingdom and Ireland compared with just under 12 
percent of Auckland’s.15
The experience of Auckland is also quite different 
from many other regions where the levels of minority 
ethnic diversity or the presence of immigrants, 
especially from Asia, is modest. There are interesting 
exceptions, but the absolute numbers and proportions 
are still small. For instance, the census indicates that 
Southland has gained new communities, in this case 
from the Philippines, to work in the dairy industry. The 
Asian percentage in Southland almost doubled from 1.3 
percent in 2006 (1,149 people) to 3.2 percent in 2013 
(2,841 people).
Other sources of diversity persist; while they might 
not have many immigrants, regions like Northland 
and Gisborne do have significant Māori populations, 
providing a further contrast in terms of ethnic 
identification and locality.
The ethnic diversity of 21st century Aotearoa also 
provides a significant contrast with mid-twentieth 
century New Zealand. The racially discriminatory 
approach to immigration has been abandoned and 
the composition of immigrant flows reflects new 
connections and interests.
Has the thinking of those of European descent – long 
accustomed to being in the majority – kept pace? New 
Zealanders who grew to adulthood before 1990 grew 
up in a more ethnically homogeneous society than the 
New Zealand of 2013, let alone the likely New Zealand 
of 2030 or 2050. For many of those generations a ‘New 
Zealander’ is someone like them, ethnically speaking, 
or is of Māori or Pasifika descent. They now also share 
the country with New Zealanders of Latin American, 
Indian, East Asian or African origin, often with different 
cultural attitudes and preferences.
One sphere in which the new ethnic diversity has 
brought other forms of diversity in its wake is religion. 
Over the last 30 years the number of New Zealanders 
declaring religious affiliation in the census has fallen 
dramatically. In 2013, 42 percent of New Zealanders 
recorded no religion in the census.16 The current 
situation is consistent with European countries, Australia 
and Canada (although not the United States).17
On the other hand there is a high proportion of 
practising Christians amongst the migrant population, 
which has contributed to the Catholic Church 
becoming the largest single denomination (11 percent). 
Muslim migrants are smaller in number, but retain a 
high incidence of religious adherence. Māori may have 
relatively low levels of religious adherence, but 66 
percent in 2013 thought spirituality was important.18
What are the implications for national or ethnic 
identities in a more diverse country? Schools, 
workplaces, health services and government 
departments will all face challenges managing the 
ethnic and religious diversity of students, employees 
and clients respectively. Does the fragmentation 
of the media – which reflects the growing interests 
and experiences of diverse communities – make it 
more difficult to discuss matters of common interest, 
especially on highly contested issues?
The most important example of 
‘diversity’ may be in the range 
of ideas about what is important 
and what is valued.
A longstanding and deep-seated desire on the part of 
the majority community to identify all New Zealanders 
with a single set of values and practices will be even 
less apt than in the past.
New Zealand is a country of many landings – from the 
first waka and the first sailing ships to today’s aeroplanes. 
That common experience of arrival, whether it be long 
in the past or only last week, links those with lengthy 
histories in Aotearoa to the newcomers. It tells of the 
scope for fruitful relationships amongst all the peoples 
for whom these islands are or have become home.
New Zealand is, increasingly, a country with 
multiple ‘national’ identities and values.
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Population change
The age structure of the population can be seen in 
age-sex pyramids. In the second half of the twentieth 
century the classic age-sex pyramid – lots of young 
people, fewer old people – became less triangular and 
more cylindrical.19 The ‘bites’ in the age pyramid are due 
mainly to changes in fertility; the impacts of migration 
and mortality are spread out across the age ranges. 
But the ‘pyramids’ of the major ethnic groups in 2013 
differ markedly one from another – Māori and Pasifika 
structures still resemble pyramids, but those for Asian 
and European ethnic groups do not (Figure 3).
The census showed a smaller rate of population 
growth than the previous inter-censal period. Slowing 
population growth is found in most parts of the world. 
It is a long-term trend, although it was interrupted in the 
mid-twentieth century in many European populations.20
Longevity
Longevity is increasing. For a very long period – all  
of New Zealand’s experience up to about 1970 – few 
people exceeded the biblical span of ‘three score and 
ten’.21 In 1950-52 life expectancy at birth was 67.2 years 
for men and 71.3 years for women.22 Increased life 
expectancy resulted from more people living closer  
to that maximum. This was initially through fewer 
deaths in infancy but in recent decades, gains in life 
expectancy have come mainly from fewer people dying 
in their 50s and 60s.23
Girls born in 2010–12 can expect to live to 83 years old 
and boys to just over 79.24 The implication is that there 
will be more centenarians in the future, and we have a 
category of ‘old old’ – those aged over 85 – contrasted 
with the ‘young old’, aged 65–84. This change owes a 
great deal to healthier life-styles.
Most experts predict that life expectancy at birth will 
not increase as much in the 21st century as it did in 
the 20th century. Rather, gains in life expectancy will 
continue to be at older ages (Table 1). The increase to 
date already presents challenges however. If people live 
longer than once was expected, it may frustrate plans 
to create a market in annuities – assured incomes for 
life. Furthermore, it complicates individual decisions 
over how to spread their earned income across their 
life, including an extended old age. Increased longevity 
therefore poses challenges to both institutions and 
individuals.
But while the last months of life incur a large fraction of 
the cost of health services, increased longevity seems 
to be delaying the incidence of that expense rather than 
extending its duration. Most people do not experience 
long periods of ill-health. The main driver of health 
spending seems not to be the growth of the aged 
population, but the progress of medical technology 
which makes possible once unimaginable life-extending 
interventions. Some health specialists think obesity 
could shorten life expectancy, but most think 
countermeasures will be effective.25
Māori and non-Māori life expectancy has continued to 
converge. Māori male life expectancy increased by 
nearly 19 years between 1950 and 2010, and that for 
females by over 20 years.26 The gap between Māori and 
non-Māori life expectancy at birth was 7.3 years based 
on death rates in 2010–12, compared with 8.2 years  
in 2005–07 and 8.5 years in 2000–02.27
Male and female life expectancy has also converged. 
The gap is about the same – four years in 1950-52 
compared with 3.7 years in 2010-12 – but that is at a 
much higher age in the latter case.
Nonetheless, there are variations around the average. 
Ethnic differences in survivorship, particularly for 
Māori at middle age, and from causes that are largely 
preventable, persist.
Māori male life expectancy at birth in 2010-12 was 72.0 
(non-Māori 80.2) and female 76.5 (non-Māori 83.7).28 
About 60 percent of the difference between Māori and 
non-Māori life expectancy comes from higher death 
rates at ages 50 to 79 years.29 More generally, some 
people can remain active into old age, others experience 
debilitating illness and disability at relatively young 
ages. Collective policies and institutions will not find  
it easy to treat people equitably.
Longevity – people 
are staying active and 
well longer, so they are 
not costing the health 
system more; however, 
people will need income 
for longer.
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Figure 3: Age population pyramids by ethnicity
2001 and 2013 Census. Source: Statistics New Zealand
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Figure 4: Total Fertility Rate (TFR) from 
1921 to 2013 for Māori and non-Māori*
Source: Statistics New Zealand
Fertility – 
New Zealand will 
adapt to an ageing 
population through 
innovation, and 
will benefit from 
youthful populations 
elsewhere in the 
world. Adapting to a 
population that will 
have more deaths 
than births will be 
more of a challenge.
Fertility
A change in the rate of natural increase is the 
main driver of slowing population growth (Figure 
4). Fewer women are having children, and women 
who have them are having fewer and at older ages. 
In the year ended December 2013 women aged 
35–39 years had a higher fertility rate (71 births 
per 1000 women) than women aged 20–24 years 
(67 births per 1000). The highest fertility rate was 
for women aged 30–34 years (114 births per 100 
women).30
Again, these are longstanding trends, and not 
peculiar to New Zealand. As incomes came to 
depend on skills rather than sheer effort, children 
required more investment.
The baby-boom from the mid-1940s to the mid- 
1960s was unusual. In the second half of the 
20th century, women exercised a claim on full 
participation in all aspects of social and public life. 
In Italy, where social institutions and customs made 
it difficult for young women to have both a career 
and a family, they chose careers. In Sweden, where 
social institutions and customs facilitated both, 
fertility levels remained higher (although they still 
declined).31
New Zealand has retained relatively high fertility 
rates by comparison with other developed 
countries. For 2011 the OECD average was 1.7: 
Israel was highest amongst OECD countries with 
3.00; New Zealand at 2.06, topped a cluster of 
other countries – Mexico, Ireland, Iceland, Turkey 
and France – which ranged from 2.04 to 2.00. 
In developing Asia, India had a rate of 2.59 and 
Indonesia 2.09.32
Māori fertility once followed a completely 
different pattern from Pākehā, with much earlier 
childbearing, shorter birth spacing and larger 
completed family size. Māori children became a 
larger proportion of the total. When the Māori 
fertility decline did eventually get under way in 
the late 1960s, it was among the most rapid and 
intense fertility transitions observed anywhere  
in the world.33
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outside New Zealand can also be promoted: national 
income can be earned by investing in workers and 
businesses in other countries just as it can be by 
bringing migrant workers to New Zealand.
An ageing population shapes social and public 
institutions. It also shapes family dynamics, especially 
combining care for aged parents with continuing care 
for late-born children who face an economy in which  
it takes longer to get settled employment. Those facing 
this double-caring burden have been termed the 
‘sandwich’ generation.37
These trends and consequent challenges have 
occurred in other countries before they have in  
New Zealand. We have an opportunity to learn from 
successful adaptation elsewhere. Equally, the 
demographic position we inherit provides us with a 
potential ‘demographic dividend’ in that we have a 
relatively large and youthful Māori and Pasifika 
population.38 There are countries which look forward  
to even greater demographic dividends, but we can  
at least seek to make better use of our opportunity.39
Adaptation not growth
It is hard to discern any likely reasons for changes in 
the underlying decline in fertility, although that was 
also said in the 1930s – no one predicted the baby 
boom.34 The complexities of childbirth for women in 
their 30s may induce earlier families, but that is likely 
to have only marginal effects on completed family size.
Pro-natal policies such as direct subsidies to mothers 
have not been that effective where tried.35 The 
strongest arguments for more children are that other 
challenges – for instance overcoming stagnant average 
incomes – are easier to manage if absolute numbers 
are increasing – and that a colourful youth culture 
is attractive. Others will prefer to emphasise a high 
productivity economy over a high birth rate.
More likely, New Zealand will adapt to lower population 
growth and a relative shortage of youth. There will be 
numerous challenges. The most obvious is in aged care, 
captured by a comment at a Hamilton workshop for this 
report: ‘who will wipe your chin?’
Small communities face demographic ‘scissors’ –  
where net migration loss combines with fertility 
decline and longevity to generate structural ageing 
and population decline. Twenty out of 67 territorial 
authorities lost population between 2006 and 2013 
(up from 15 between 2001 and 2006). Furthermore, 613 
out of 1869 census area units (from fewer than 500 
between 2001 and 2006) declined in the same period.36 
And at some future time, this pattern now found only 
in rural New Zealand, could be replicated nationally.
It makes sense to focus more on productivity than 
population totals. In the future, employers will need  
to look further than just at young employees for 
innovation. The growing cohort of ‘active old’ will also 
look for ways to continue to earn income or participate 
in community affairs. The advantages of investing 
Table 1: Lifespan after age 65
Source: Commission for Financial Literacy and Retirement Income (2013) Longevity trends and their implications for the age of eligibility for  
New Zealand Superannuation. A paper prepared for the 2013 Review of Retirement Income Policy, by Alison O’Connell.
Year of birth 1928 1938 1948 1958 1968 1978 1988
Lifespan from age 65
Male 17.1 19.3 20.8 22.1 23.4 24.5 25.5
Female 20.4 21.9 23.3 24.6 25.7 26.7 27.6
14   OUR FUTURES  | TE PAE TĀWHITI
Tangata whenua
Age structure and growth
Like other indigenous peoples in the settler states of 
North America and Australia, Māori occupy a unique 
position in the national polity of Aotearoa New Zealand. 
As tangata whenua and Treaty partners, Māori see 
themselves as distinct from the Pākehā majority and 
from new settler ethnic groups. The 2013 census 
recorded 598,600 ethnic Māori.40 Overall, Māori 
comprised about 15 percent of the national population, 
a proportion similar to 2006, but much higher than 
the indigenous share in North America or Australia.41 
A larger category comprised the 668,724 who in 
2013 reported being of Māori descent (though not 
necessarily of Māori ethnicity).42 The gap between the 
two figures reveals subtle differences in how identity  
is understood and expressed.43
The age structure of the Māori population differs 
markedly from the national pattern, reflecting 
differences in past and present fertility behaviour and 
mortality experiences.44 The youngest age cohorts 
are by far the largest, although the proportion of 
children (0–14 years) has been declining since at least 
2001. The Māori median age of just under 24 years 
remains significantly younger than both the national 
and European median age (38 and 41 years). While 
structurally youthful, the number of older Māori at 
kaumātua age (65+ years) has grown rapidly over the 
last decade owing to improvements in survivorship, 
and will continue to increase at a faster rate than in 
other ethnic groups. Natural increase is the key driver 
of Māori population growth, whereas immigration 
also contributes significantly to Asian and Pasifika 
growth. Even with above replacement fertility, the 
growth potential of Māori is constrained and, in coming 
decades, is unlikely to keep pace with the growth of 
other minority groups. Projections suggest that by 
2026 the number of Māori and people from Asian 
ethnic groups combined will reach parity at around 
800,000 each.45
Distribution and mobility
Māori are mostly an urban-dwelling people and this 
has been the case since the 1960s.46 In 2013 Māori 
had nearly the same rate of urbanization (85 percent) 
as the population as a whole (86 percent), although 
the proportion living in main urban areas (at least 
30,000 residents) was below the national average. 
Māori continue to be unevenly distributed across 
the country and demonstrate a great deal of regional 
diversity in terms of demographic visibility (Figure 5). 
Using Auckland as an example, in 2013 nearly one in 
four Māori lived there but because the region is also 
a major destination for migrants, the Māori population 
share was far below the national average. The regions 
with the highest Māori proportion in 2013 were Gisborne 
and Northland (45.1 and 29.6 percent respectively), 
which are also areas of high socio-economic 
deprivation.47 In terms of cultural vitality, however, 
regions with a large Māori share also tend to have  
a higher proportion of te reo speakers.48
As with New Zealanders generally, there is a sizeable 
Māori diaspora. It is estimated that at least one in six 
Māori reside outside of New Zealand, with the majority 
living across the Tasman.49 The 2011 Australian census 
recorded just over 128,000 usual residents of Māori 
ancestry.50 One third were Australian-born and five 
percent were at least third generation migrants. Māori 
migrants face particular challenges around language 
retention, reflecting ongoing struggles to revitalise 
te reo in Aotearoa. The proportion of te reo Māori 
speakers in Australia is far lower than the share of 
speakers in Aotearoa, and the share of mother tongue 
speakers in other Australian-based migrant groups.51 
The extent to which Māori in Australia retain their 
connections to Māori culture, identity and institutions 
is an important question for Māori on both sides of the 
Tasman. The experience of the rapid and extensive 
Māori rural-urban migration suggests that the outcome 
is more likely to be oriented towards cultural adaptation 
and innovation, than to detachment or demise.
Māori culture and institutions continue to endure 
and evolve along with demographic change, but 
the maintenance of te reo Māori faces challenges.
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Māori percentage of regional population1
Percentage of total NZ Māori population
1. Total regional population includes those not stating ethnicity.
Figure 5: Māori population by region
2013 Census. Source: Statistics New Zealand
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Figure 6: Age-specific rates of te reo speakers
2006 and 2013 Census. Source: Statistics New Zealand
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A youthful age structure but with a rapidly growing 
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Cultural Identity and wellbeing
Many Māori live, work and raise their families in 
diverse cultural contexts.52 About half of Māori 
adults are either married to or living with a non-Māori 
partner,53 and more than half of Māori in the 2013 
census identified with at least one other ethnic 
group. By contrast, only a relatively small proportion 
of Pākehā partner with Māori, largely reflecting 
differences in group size. This unevenness means  
that at a population level, Māori engage with 
biculturalism in ways that simply do not come into 
play for many other ethnic groups.
Notwithstanding a long history of intermarriage and 
more than a century of policies promoting cultural 
assimilation, Māori have actively sought to retain  
their distinctive identities, customs and institutions.  
In the inaugural Māori Social Survey, Te Kupenga,54  
70 percent of Māori adults said it was at least 
somewhat important for them to be involved in things 
to do with Māori culture; just over 70 percent knew  
their marae tipuna (ancestral marae); and 62 percent 
had visited their ancestral marae at some stage.55
Whānau is grounded in the concept of whakapapa  
and extends far beyond the census-defined 
household.56 Expressions of whānau have expanded 
in recent times to include relationships based on 
common interests and activities (e.g. kapa haka and 
kohanga reo whānau). Subjective evaluations of 
whānau wellbeing reported in Te Kupenga are also  
far more positive than the findings derived from 
material measures of wellbeing.57
The revitalisation of te reo Māori, however, remains  
an ongoing concern. The 2013 census recorded an 
absolute fall in the number of te reo speakers for the 
first time since the language question was introduced 
in 1996. In 2013 the number decreased to nearly 
125,400 from just over 131,600 in 2006.58 The 
proportion speaking te reo was also smaller in both 
2006 and 2013 compared to previous censuses.  
The decline may reflect a number of factors including 
losses through emigration, the passing of older cohorts 
of native speakers and a slowing down in the rate of  
te reo acquisition through kōhanga and kura. As figure  
6 shows, the decline in the share of te reo speakers 
has been especially marked at older ages.
Treaty relations and iwi
Māori have always sought to maintain their own culture 
and autonomy as well as to participate in the political 
entity which developed in New Zealand after European 
settlement.59 Since the 1980s, Māori-Pākehā political 
interactions have largely focused on the Treaty 
settlement process. Ngāi Tahu and Waikato-Tainui  
were among the first iwi to reach settlements with the 
Crown, along with other iwi and Māori authorities, 
and have become significant players in their regional 
economies, and in the ‘Māori economy’.60 While the 
census has long documented Māori employment, 
occupational spread and incomes, the rise of the Māori 
economy has engendered new ways of thinking  
about Māori economic activities and wealth creation.
The heightened public profile of iwi has been 
accompanied by a growing willingness by individuals 
to express an iwi affiliation. At the 1991 census, 77 
percent of Māori descendants reported at least one  
iwi, increasing to 83 percent by 2006. In 2013 the share 
remained unchanged as did the proportion reporting  
at least two iwi (nearly 40 percent of those stated).  
As with most social phenomena, aggregate patterns 
mask a great deal of internal variation and growth 
patterns vary tremendously between iwi. Ngāi Tahu,  
for example, nearly doubled in size between 1991 and 
2001; Waikato iwi experienced a small decline between 
2001 and 2006, but increased between 2006 and 
2013; and some other iwi had modest or stagnant 
growth. The subjective nature of identification means 
that non-demographic factors are important to 
understand when projecting and planning for future  
iwi population growth.61
As highlighted elsewhere in this report, Māori record 
poorer outcomes than Pākehā and Asian peoples on 
a variety of population and economic indicators. 
Nonetheless, in recent decades the emphasis in Māori 
life has shifted from seeking redress for historical 
wrongdoings towards autonomous leadership and 
participation in public life in ways that reflect Māori 
values and aspirations. New Zealand’s public life  
must evolve to take account of these changes. Issues 
relating to political representation and participation in 
decision-making on issues of national importance, such 
as immigration, will continue to be keenly debated.
Māori participation in the economy is now 
underpinned by significant assets as well as labour.
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Migration
Visitors and tourists
On any given day in 2013 around 140,000 people 
who usually live overseas were in New Zealand and 
around 115,000 New Zealand residents were outside 
the country.62 The 140,000 visitors are not counted 
in the resident population of New Zealand, but they 
represent the equivalent of the population of a city 
the size of Hamilton drawing on services and facilities  
in the country every day.
These daily visitor figures are small relative to New 
Zealand’s population of 4.2 million, but over a whole 
year it meant that in 2013, for instance, around 2.7 
million overseas people made short-term journeys 
to New Zealand and a little over two million New 
Zealanders did the same from New Zealand.63 In other 
words, more than the entire New Zealand population 
entered and left the country in a given year.
Fifty years ago, before the advent of long-haul aircraft, 
the figure for overseas visitors was approximately a 
quarter of a million (compared with a total population 
of 2.6 million) and over half of that number were ship 
passengers and crews. Even twenty years ago, long 
after the advent of long-haul aircraft, the number of 
international visitors was less than half the 2013 total 
– at around 1.1 million.64
What will happen in the next twenty to thirty years? 
It is estimated that around 80 million Chinese tourists 
travelled overseas in 2012.65 This equates to almost 
four times the population of Australia, New Zealand’s 
biggest source of tourists.66 We may see massive 
growth in tourist numbers from China and India as 
their middle classes seek out ‘clean and green’ places 
for their holidays. On the other hand, extrapolation is 
not fact. Japanese tourist numbers to New Zealand 
quadrupled in the 1980s, but in 2013 they were not 
much more than half the 1993-94 level.67
Long-term migration
In 2013 New Zealand had a net permanent and long-
term (PLT) migrant gain of 22,468. Seventy five percent 
of this was accounted for by roughly equal numbers 
from China, India and the United Kingdom, and another 
20 percent by approximately equal numbers from 
Germany and the Philippines.68
In 2013, 3,000 more men than women arrived, while 500 
more women left for 12 months or more. New Zealand  
is following global trends with regard to the feminisation 
of migration, and women have become as mobile as 
men when it comes to movement across New Zealand’s 
international border, even though men still seem to 
dominate some of the longer-term temporary flows.69
In 2013 total PLT arrivals were around 94,000, and total 
PLT departures around 71,500, thus giving a net overall 
inflow of 22,500. Taking just the movement back and 
forth across the Tasman, however, there was a net 
outflow of nearly 20,000 to Australia.70
This pattern of a select number of countries being net 
providers of most new immigrants and Australia being 
a net receiver of emigrants from New Zealand has been 
characteristic since the mid-1960s.
The flows can change in scale and direction very quickly. 
In 2002 and 2003 there were net migration gains of well 
over 30,000, but in 2011 and 2012 there were small net 
migration losses.71
Changes are driven as much by decisions by New 
Zealanders and Australians (not subject to regulation) 
as by other nationalities or by New Zealand immigration 
policy.72 This is because of the large New Zealand 
expatriate population (estimated to be somewhere 
between 750,000 and one million depending how you 
classify ‘New Zealanders’) and the right of Australians 
to unrestricted access to New Zealand.
As many people enter and leave New Zealand each 
year as the country’s total population (4.2 million).
Permanent and long-term net migration is 
significantly influenced by the movement  
of New Zealanders, making it very difficult to 
control net flows by immigration policy.
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Taking a lower estimate of the expatriate population, 
at least 780,000 people born in New Zealand lived 
overseas in 2013, of whom at least 75 percent lived in 
Australia.73 Australia’s total population in 2013 was 23 
million – over five times that of New Zealand.
In 2013, of 94,000 PLT arrivals, 31,000 were either  
New Zealanders or Australians.74 Of 71,500 PLT 
departures in 2013, just over 50,000 were New Zealand 
or Australian citizens.75
When so many migration decisions – to leave, to come, 
to come back – cannot be regulated, it is very difficult 
to set migration targets. This has long been the case 
in New Zealand and will continue to be so in coming 
decades.
New Zealand has also accepted responsibilities to 
selected Pacific countries. While current migrant 
numbers are relatively small (a net migration gain of 
less than 1,000 in 2013) a major environmental or 
other crisis could have a significant effect on the 
total.76 The same is true in respect of New Zealand’s 
refugee intake policy.
Immigration has made a contribution to population 
increase in most years in the 21st century. The 
population increased by an average of 30,000 annually 
between 2001 and 2013; over those years net migration 
averaged just under 14,000.77 (Figure 7)
New immigrants
The principal vehicle for new migrants (as against 
returning New Zealanders) is a scheme which 
emphasises work skills and the economic value of 
migration. Priority is given to migrants who already 
have a job offer in New Zealand and the great majority 
of people admitted in the skilled migrant category  
(86 percent in the year ended June 2013) have already 
had a temporary work, study or visitor visa in New 
Zealand.78 When they apply for residence they are  
not strangers to New Zealand.
Migration likely creates valuable links between New 
Zealand and international markets. Entrepreneurial 
potential, skill acquisition, and having a good job 
guaranteed on arrival remain the best criteria  
for selection. The argument that migrants are over-
concentrated in activities less productive than 
agriculture is not entirely out of date, but construction 
has replaced manufacturing in this category.
Temporary residents provide an important short-term 
work force, especially in horticulture and hospitality. 
The total numbers granted temporary work and study 
visas in the year ended June 2013 were, respectively, 
144,978 and 64,233. The number of temporary work 
permits in 2012-13 was the largest ever, while study 
visa numbers were well down on the record 87,800  
a decade earlier.79
Temporary residents are an important source of  
long-term migrants. Of the 38,961 approvals for 
residence (all categories) in the year ended June 2013, 
63 percent had had work visas, 11 percent study visas 
and 26 percent visitor visas.80 In total, 83 percent of all 
residence approvals had held a temporary visa at some 
point since 1997/98.81 These numbers can rise and fall 
very sharply. Foreign language students in New Zealand 
increased sharply in the early 2000s, but halved 
between 2002 and 2005.82
Circular migration
Many countries, like New Zealand, have large inward 
and outward migrant flows relative to the net gain or 
loss. This will continue.
Policy makers need to understand the decision-making 
of both groups. Emigrants and immigrants both 
compare expected well-being in two feasible locations, 
taking into account job prospects, personal ties, and 
welfare entitlements. Both groups will seek trustworthy 
informants – often relatives and friends. Both groups 
will spend a lot of money to migrate. Should they 
also be assisted? New migrants can pose particular 
challenges for the health system, especially if their 
immunization records are incomplete.
Many migrants leave after a relatively brief period in 
New Zealand.83 In the year ended June 2013, just under 
40,000 (14 percent) of the 287,700 people approved 
for residence between 2005-06 and 2011-13, who 
actually arrived in New Zealand, had been absent  
for six months or more continuously.84 The incidence  
of long-term absenteeism was highest amongst US 
nationals, followed by Canadians (26 percent) and 
citizens of Singapore (25 percent).85 Pasifika populations 
display high levels of mobility between New Zealand, 
Australia and Pacific Island countries.86
Welfare entitlements do not migrate automatically 
with migrants nor meet them on arrival. Australia 
significantly restricted New Zealanders’ entitlement 
to Australian welfare in 2001. The current debate 
about this is not incidental, but the forerunner of many 
such issues. New Zealand must respond carefully 
rather than in ‘tit for tat’ fashion; a significant share 
of ‘Australians’ resident in New Zealand are after all 
the families and children of New Zealanders who have 
returned from Australia.
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Figure 7: Population changes between 1961-2013 by natural increase and migration
Source: Statistics New Zealand
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1. For the estimated de facto population, excess of registered births 
over registered deaths. For the estimated resident population, 
excess of estimated births over estimated deaths (both by date 
of occurrence).
2. For the estimated de facto population, excess of total arrivals 
over total departures. Excludes armed forces before 1987. For the 
estimated resident population, excess of permanent and long-term 
arrivals over permanent and long-term departures. A minus sign 
denotes an excess of departures over arrivals.
3. The difference between two population estimates that arises from 
errors in the census-based estimates and/or components of change. 
The adjustment is calculated at the end of each intercensal period.
4. From population estimates. Population change for the June 1991 
year is not available, as resident population estimates have only 
been revised back to 31 March 1991.
5. The estimated de facto population is based on the census night 
population count, updated for births, deaths, and net migration 
between census night and the date of the estimate. De facto 
population estimates include visitors from overseas, but exclude 
New Zealand residents who are temporarily overseas.
6. The estimated resident population is based on the census usually 
resident population count, updated for: residents missed or 
counted more than once by the census (net census undercount); 
residents temporarily overseas on census night; and births, 
deaths, and net migration between census night and the date of 
the estimate. Resident population estimates exclude visitors from 
overseas, but include New Zealand residents who are temporarily 
overseas.
Temporary workers and those on study visas have 
become a much more prominent part of migration 
to New Zealand in the past decade, including as an 
important source of permanent residents.
New (non-New Zealand) migrants are primarily 
recruited for their skills; they also provide links 
with their home countries that are valuable for 
New Zealand as a whole.
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Households and families
In 2013, New Zealanders lived in 1.55 million separate 
households. Overwhelmingly, these were couple (with  
or without children) or single parent households.
These categories accounted for 68 percent (the first 
three rows in Table 2) with almost another quarter 
in single person households, leaving just over eight 
percent for all other formations – two or more families 
living together, or multi-person households. About half 
the couple households included children and about 
half did not. These patterns have been stable since 
2001 – remarkably so, as Table 2 indicates.87
There are regional variations. Auckland had significantly 
fewer households without children than New Zealand 
as a whole – 24 percent being couples without children 
households (with possibly an unrelated adult) and 19 
percent single person households. In the South Island 
no less than 46 percent of households were couples 
without children.88 Wellington stood out for the number 
of single person (25 percent) and car-less households 
(Table 3).89 In all regions the percentage of couple 
households without children had risen since 2006,  
but the trend was modest.
There was a marked difference in median household 
income between Auckland and Wellington on the 
one hand and the other regions (with the partial 
exception of Canterbury) on the other. The three main 
regions were the only three in which over one third 
of households had incomes of more than $100,000 
annually (Table 4).90
Unequal households?
The percentage of dwellings owned or partly owned 
(that is, via a mortgage) fell from 68 percent in 2001 
to 65 percent in 2013 (this latter figure includes 
dwellings held in a family trust, a census category 
that did not exist in 2001). That meant that rented 
accommodation increased from 32 percent to 35 
percent of all dwellings.91
The number of households living in disadvantaged 
circumstances was fewer than the number in rented 
accommodation. The findings of the NZ General  
Social Survey (NZGSS), conducted biennially over the 
years 2008-2013, suggest that around 15 percent of 
households lived in difficult circumstances with the 
percentage varying depending on the measure used. 
Six percent of households reported overcrowding.92 
Ten percent reported two or more problems with their 
house. Using a standard of living index, seven percent 
of surveyed households judged their circumstances  
to be ‘restricted’ or ‘very restricted’ and another six 
percent ‘somewhat restricted’. Responses on a 
subjective standard of living index were similar: five 
percent considered their standard of living low or 
very low; seven percent were ‘dissatisfied’ or ‘very 
dissatisfied’ with their standard of living and 15 percent 
felt they did not have enough money to get by on.93
Some other data supported these findings. The number 
of two-family households in Auckland rose from 3.5 
percent to 5.4 percent, which translated (owing to the 
effect of population increase) to there having been 
nearly twice as many such households in Auckland in 
2013 as in 2001 (24,615/13,257).94 The fact that this 
trend was marked in Auckland (although the rise is 
consistent throughout the country) suggests it might 
be linked in part with internal and international 
migration into the region. It might also be linked to the 
ethnic composition of Auckland’s population. Multi-
family households (where family is defined as couples 
or sole parent with or without children) are common 
amongst the Pasifika population where parents often 
live with their adult children and their grandchildren.95 
Māori conceptions of whānau are more expansive and 
multi-faceted than can readily be captured by census 
household data.
Many children live in 
households which 
have limited income 
and assets. Many of 
those households are 
headed by women.
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Table 3: Percentages of total households stated by number of cars
2013 Census. Source: Statistics New Zealand
Auckland Wellington Canterbury New Zealand
No car 7.5 11.6 6.5 7.9
One car 34.2 44.0 34.7 37.6
Two cars 39.9 33.3 39.6 38.4
Three or more cars 18.4 11.1 19.1 16.1
Table 4: Household income by region
2013 Census. Source: Statistics New Zealand
Auckland Wellington Canterbury All other regions New Zealand
Median household 
income per annum
$76,500 $74,300 $65,000 Range from $46,900 
(Northland) to 
$59,600 (Waikato)
$63,800
There has been a rise in two family households.
Table 2: Percentages of total households stated by household type
2001, 2006 and 2013 Census. Source: Statistics New Zealand
Household type 2001 2006 2013
Couple, no children* 27.1 27.7 28.1
Couple, children* 29.7 29.7 28.9
One parent, children* 12.3 11.7 11.2
Two families 2.0 2.6 3.1
Unrelated (‘flatting’) 4.3 4.1 3.9
Single person 23.4 23.0 23.5
All other 1.1 1.2 1.2
*can include an unrelated individual
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Households, children and poverty
Can a profile be created of the 15 percent of households 
in difficult circumstances (assuming that there was a 
high correlation between the responses cited above)? 
When adjusted for the number of earners, household 
income was influenced by family type (categorized  
by the number of dependents) and occupation. 
Household overcrowding was influenced by family  
type and household size.96
Ethnicity bore a much less predictable relationship to 
indices of household disadvantage, possibly because 
many households were comprised of members with 
different ethnic affiliations.
Families with a large number of dependents are 
particularly likely to be disadvantaged, irrespective  
of the kind of household they live in.97 It follows that 
relatively large numbers of children may be affected. 
These may be either children in large families or 
children with only a single parent. While just over  
11 percent of households were single parent families, 
around 30 percent of children lived in those 
households.98
According to the Ministry of Social Development’s 2014 
figures, some 285,000 children (or 27 percent of all 
children) lived in households where the total income 
was less than 60 percent of the contemporary median 
household income (after housing costs). Some 60 
percent of these children were expected to live in 
poverty for at least their first seven years.99
Within Auckland, poverty is concentrated in parts of  
the city. For example the latest census figures show 
that the median incomes of people living in Mangere 
and St Heliers have diverged; the median incomes of 
persons living in Mangere have actually fallen since 
the last census in 2006.100 The occurrence of so-called 
‘third-world’ diseases such as rheumatic fever and 
whooping cough indicates that New Zealand faces a 
problem that is most unusual for a developed country 
and demands urgent attention.
How much of this disadvantage is inherited? Evidence 
from international analyses of intergenerational 
income mobility – using income from work, assets  
and welfare – indicates that the ‘extent of transmission 
of family income across generations is large and even 
larger than that of earnings’.101 In the last generation the 
transmission of wealth has also become a significant 
source of on-going inequality. The 2013 household 
incomes report suggests that wealth inequality is about 
two to three times higher than income inequality.102
One study based on the uptake of the unemployment 
and domestic purposes benefit estimated an 
intergenerational correlation of 0.37 for the entire 
sample, and higher than that for females, Māori,  
and individuals without educational qualifications. 
In other words, the educational attainments of both 
parents and the proportion of years spent in a  
single-parent household explained nearly two-thirds 
of the effect. The remaining third reflected the lower 
educational attainments of children raised in 
households dependent on welfare for their income.103
Gender shapes sole parent families and households. 
Such families and households can be under greater 
economic pressure than two-parent families or 
households irrespective of the sex of the parent;  
if the parent is female that can compound the 
economic or financial disadvantage. In 2013, of just  
over 200,000 sole parent families, 82 percent were 
headed by a female.104
Until the 1970s social policy assumed that a 
‘breadwinner’ wage for adult males coupled with some 
assistance from the state would enable all families  
to participate fully in the life of the community. 
Households and families were seen to roughly equate. 
In 2013, households comprise many different kinds of 
families. This stems in part from the diversity of ethnic 
groups, the recognition of same-sex relationships 
(with or without children), the number of single parent 
families, and the number of multi-generation families. 
These complexities will continue to challenge the 
formulation of social policy in the 21st century.
Household patterns have changed little in the  
21st century.
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Regional variation
Features
New Zealand’s population was 85 percent urban in 
1986; the proportion has barely changed since then 
but the proportion living in Auckland has risen from 
one quarter to one-third between 1986 and 2013.105 
Auckland’s size makes it important for many businesses 
and individuals in other regions.106 Equally, materials 
and products can move between regions before being 
exported, perhaps far from where they originated. 
Regional variation needs to be set in the context of 
such integration.
Auckland accounted for just over half of the population 
growth in New Zealand between 2006 and 2013. In the 
rest of the North Island, growth was mainly confined  
to major centres – Hamilton, Tauranga, Napier-Hastings, 
Palmerston North, and greater Wellington (including 
Kapiti) – with New Plymouth notable amongst smaller 
cities and zones of population growth elsewhere.
In the South Island both Canterbury and Southland 
gained population, a result in part of the turn to 
dairying. Central Otago (including Queenstown) and 
Nelson-Tasman grew, but at a slightly slower rate than 
between 2001 and 2006. Marlborough, West Coast, 
and coastal Otago grew slowly or not at all, as in 
2001–2006, although there were pockets of growth  
in all areas in both periods.
In the South Island only Southland had a Māori 
population close to the national average, and Pasifika 
populations were small. Populations of Asian origin 
were far more significant in Auckland than anywhere 
else in the country.
Challenges
The ongoing growth of Auckland, both economically  
and in terms of population size, highlights the 
significance of urban economies, especially in terms of 
the co-location of firms and the concentration of skills, 
but this is complicated for New Zealand by location 
choices that have increasingly included an Australian 
city, or one elsewhere in the world.
Recent censuses have shown that Auckland sometimes 
experiences small net losses of population through 
migration in both directions with all other regions of New 
Zealand. It is overseas migration, rather than internal 
mobility, that makes migration a net contributor to the 
growth of Auckland’s population.107
That is reflected in Auckland’s high (39 percent) 
proportion of overseas-born. The regions with the next- 
highest proportion of overseas-born people in 2013 
were Wellington (25 percent), Nelson (21 percent), and 
Canterbury (20 percent).
As those other percentages indicate, not all migrants 
go to Auckland but the proportion varies markedly 
depending on the source country. Of recent (since 2008) 
overseas migrants just over half were living in other parts 
of New Zealand. For those born in English-speaking 
countries and Germany that figure was around two- 
thirds. But for those from India the figure was only just 
over 43 percent, for Samoa, Tonga and Fiji it averaged 
around 33 percent and for China just under 30 percent.108
New Zealand has always had very high levels of migration 
from district to district, suburb to suburb, and even street 
to street. For the twentieth century these rates were 
between two and three times as high as those of Western 
Europe, and vastly higher than those for most other 
regions in the world. New Zealand’s rates were always 
among the highest, and in some decades were the 
highest. In the 1970s, the period for which the most 
robust comparative data exist, Westland, which had the 
lowest rate of residential mobility of any province, still 
exceeded the moving rate in ‘low-mobility nations’.109
In respect of internal migration, Waikato saw the biggest 
net gain between 2006 and 2013; it came from both the 
working age and the youthful and aged population (15 
and under, and 65 and over). Wellington and Otago also 
saw net gains from internal migration; in Wellington’s 
case this was predominantly from the working age 
Regions are not discrete units – they are also defined  
by their interconnections, including those that all regions 
have with Auckland.
Auckland is very 
distinctive in respect 
of both rate of growth 
and the composition 
of its population.
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population. Bay of Plenty had a net migration gain 
predominantly of the non-working age population.110
Overall, however, internal migration, measured by 
changes of residence between the two censuses, 
decelerated. Whether this can be explained simply 
by the increased concentration of population in the 
Auckland region, or is an impact of general ageing, 
remains to be determined. A similar trend in interstate 
migration in the US seems to be related to labour 
market conditions.111
Implications
The principal implication of these reflections is that 
we should not too readily project the current situation 
into the future. On the other hand demographic trends 
suggest that ‘no growth’ will become more rather than 
less common. On the other hand, districts currently 
experiencing slow population growth should reflect that 
a few years ago Tauranga was expected to become 
essentially a retirement location, not a major port and 
service centre. Havelock North and Ashburton were 
regarded similarly, but the wine industry and dairying 
respectively have changed their current circumstances 
dramatically. Dairying has similarly changed Southland’s 
prospects.
Some territorial local authorities will have increasing 
difficulty in maintaining service levels for an ageing 
and possibly dwindling population, not to mention 
burgeoning numbers of visitors and tourists (Table 5). 
Reluctance to accept withdrawal of local infrastructure, 
whether post offices, schools, medical services or other 
amenities will be more intense rather than less. In the 
three years ended December 2013, deaths exceeded 
births in Thames-Coromandel, Kapiti Coast, Horowhenua, 
and Timaru districts. Should the central government 
plan ‘red zones’ for local authorities unable to meet their 
responsibilities? In some rural areas roads are already 
too costly for locals to maintain, even though they are 
essential to their present-day economies. Queenstown-
Lakes has canvassed the possibility of a local tourist 
or bed tax to pay for infrastructure; an indication of the 
challenges faced, rather than a simple solution.102
Christchurch is a special case. The earthquakes have 
resulted in significant population shifts within as well 
as out of Christchurch and Canterbury. Just beyond 
the Christchurch urban area, Waimakariri and Selwyn 
districts have been among the fastest growing in the 
country. While Christchurch city’s population fell from 
348,459 to 341,472 between 2001 and 2006, the two 
neighbouring districts increased from 76,476 to 94,584. 
The extent to which this reflects temporary features  
and the extent to which it is a variant on the national 
picture is uncertain.
Table 5: Projected percentage of 
population growth at 65+ years 
2011–2031, medium projection
Source: Statistics New Zealand, N.O. Jackson (2013)
Districts Percentage
Auckland, Hamilton City, 
Queenstown-Lakes District
36 – 37%
Tauranga City, Wellington 
City, Selwyn District
44 – 46%
Waikato District, 
Palmerston North City, 
Waimakariri District
60 – 63%
Whangārei District, 
Christchurch City
95%
The other 56 Territorial 
Authority areas
100%
Many districts 
outside Auckland 
face the challenge of 
matching ongoing 
responsibilities with 
fewer resources 
to discharge them.
Canterbury has been 
distinctive in the 
last inter-censal 
period on account 
of the 2010/11 
earthquakes.
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Work
Long-term trends
The majority of the working age population is involved 
in some form of paid work, but the nature of that work 
continues to change.
The changing nature of demand – the shift in 
employment by industries, in terms of location and  
the rise and fall of occupations – is accompanied by 
changes in labour supply, including the ageing of the 
population, the contraction in entry level cohorts and 
the reliance on immigrant labour.
Primary and secondary industries were historically 
major employers. The former was not only important 
economically but until the 1920s was relatively labour-
intensive. Secondary industry grew during and after 
the Second World War and peaked at 36 percent of the 
workforce in 1966.113 Since 1940, service industries have 
grown dramatically and the 2013 census confirms this.
Sector growth
The fastest-growing ‘industry’ sector (there are eighteen 
in total covering the whole economy) between 2006 
and 2013 was health and social assistance (growth of 
just under 20 percent); it is now the largest employer  
of New Zealanders (191,694 people; ten percent of the 
workforce). By contrast 29,472 fewer people were 
employed in the manufacturing sector in 2013 than in 
2006114 (Figure 8).
The move to sectors with a higher proportion of skilled 
labour is also apparent in the growth of the professional, 
scientific and technical services sector (plus ten percent 
and comprising just under nine percent of those 
employed and with 46 percent women) and the 
education and training sector (plus 12.5 percent).115
The decline or disappearance of industries that 
employed significant numbers in the decades after the 
war has impacted especially on the new arrivals from 
the regional and rural hinterland of New Zealand.  
The concentration of Māori and Pasifika in these low-
skilled occupations has meant those communities have 
been hard hit by the shrinkage in those industries.
Occupational change
The occupational structure of the workforce shifted  
to the disadvantage of the less skilled between 2006 
and 2013, although not markedly. Professionals 
increased from 20 to 22.5 percent of the workforce and 
managers from just over 18 to just under 19 percent of 
the workforce. Almost all the less skilled occupations 
(including clerical, sales work and labouring) employed 
fewer people than in 2006 (Figure 9).
Agglomeration
There are important regional differences in terms 
of employment, especially in relation to the mix of 
industries, but also in terms of other attributes of 
the local labour market. Auckland benefits from 
agglomeration – that is, it has grown faster than 
average on account of gains, to both employment  
and productivity, that arise from the clustering of 
economic activity.116
In the 12 months to December 2013, Auckland gained 
48,000 jobs (growth of just under seven percent), 
while unemployment fell. The largest number of new 
jobs (21,000) were in the professional, scientific 
and technical services sector, followed by retail, 
accommodation and food (+14,200 jobs), confirming 
the dominance of service sector growth.117
The second and third largest cities, Christchurch 
and Wellington, suffered shocks, in the first case due 
to earthquakes (although the rebuild should restore 
jobs). Wellington saw an increase in jobs in the public 
administration, health care and education sectors but 
a decrease in manufacturing between 2006 and 2013.118
Auckland had the 
greatest absolute and 
proportionate growth 
in jobs of any region.
Pākehā, Māori and 
Pasifika have different 
employment patterns.
Unemployment has 
increased since 2006.
The employment 
experience of men  
and women differs  
in several respects.
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Gender and employment
Employment remains highly differentiated by gender. 
The 2013 census showed that the manufacturing and 
transport sectors were just under 30 percent female, 
but the education and health sectors were 74 percent 
and 82 percent respectively.
Women remain less likely to maintain work continuity 
and their salary/wage levels were on average below 
those of men (Figure 10). The employment rate for 
women was 57 percent, but for men 68 percent. 
In contrast, whereas only nine percent of women 
reported no unpaid activities, 15 percent of men did.119
The full impact of the feminisation of the paid workforce, 
especially in the service and retail sectors, has operated 
in ways not fully understood. Since the 1970s:
• the two-income household has become increasingly 
common.
• males with tertiary qualifications have tended to be 
pushed up the occupational ladder, while those with 
low educational qualifications find it increasingly 
hard to find work.
• women in part-time and low-paid jobs adversely 
affect median pay for the workforce as a whole 
(although they themselves are often better off than 
their mothers, let alone their grandmothers).
Work rich, work poor
Long-term exclusive employment in one job, for one 
employer or in a particular occupation or industry 
is now less common than 30 years ago.120 Fewer 
New Zealanders are involved in full-time, ongoing 
employment and a variety of non-standard forms of 
employment are now much more apparent amongst 
the paid workforce. This is likely to continue, and to 
continue to have variable impacts on individuals and 
households.
The 2013 census indicated that only about 15,000  
more people were in employment than in 2006 (the 
definition of employed is anyone who has worked 
one hour or more for pay or profit) and the increase 
was entirely in female employment. But the female 
unemployment rate was higher – it rose from 5.8 
percent in 2006 to eight percent in 2013, compared 
with a rise in male unemployment from 4.5 percent to 
6.3 percent.121
A labour market core continued to experience 
employment stability and decent salaries/wages, but 
others were in work with limited job security. The 
growing significance of part-time work was marked  
for males. Thirteen percent of the male workforce was 
in part-time employment in both 2006 and 2013  
compared with only four percent in 1981. The change 
has not been as marked for women, for whom part-time 
work has always been more significant; it accounted for 
31.5 percent of the female workforce in 1981 and 33.9 
percent in 2013.122
Work-rich households contrast with work-poor ones. 
Those in the former have invested in post-secondary 
qualifications while those in the latter either have 
qualifications inappropriate to a changed labour 
market or lack advanced credentials altogether.
Māori and Pasifika are more likely to be in work-poor 
households or have more precarious employment. In 
2013 the unemployment rate for the European ethnic 
group was 4.4 percent whereas for the Māori and 
Pasifika groups it was 14.3 percent and 14.9 percent 
respectively.123
More recently, new entrants to the labour market have 
struggled, whether they are school leavers, graduates 
or immigrants. Since the onset of the global financial 
crisis in 2008 the numbers categorized as NEET (Not 
in Employment, Education or Training) increased 
significantly. The numbers of unemployed in their 
late teens and early twenties has grown accordingly 
(the unemployed in the 15-24 age groups grew from 
48,000 in 2006 to 61,000 in 2013). For young Māori 
and Pasifika the rates are particularly severe. Māori  
and Pasifika males aged 20-29 had unemployment 
rates of 17 and 16 percent respectively and 25 percent 
of Māori and Pasifika females in the same age group 
were also unemployed.124 At the other end of a working 
life, the numbers over the age of 65 who were employed 
in paid work grew significantly, from 81,000 in 2006 to 
129,500 in 2013.
Young Māori and 
Pasifika women have 
very high rates of 
unemployment.
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Figure 8: Major industry groups for employed people aged 15 years and over
2006 and 2013 Census. Source: Statistics New Zealand
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2013
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The health sector is the biggest employer 
of any sector.
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Figure 9: Major occupational groups for employed people aged 15 years and over
2006 and 2013 Census. Source: Statistics New Zealand
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Figure 10: Total personal income for people aged 15 years and over (by sex)
2013 Census. Source: Statistics New Zealand
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Part-time work has not increased as a proportion 
of total employment since 2006.
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Our futures
On 25 May 2014 Peg Griffin of the Kapiti Coast 
celebrated her 110th birthday.125 The older cohort of 
today’s population may readily comprehend the early 
20th century (within the lifetime of their parents) or 
even the late 19th century (the youthful years of their 
grandparents).
Many of the 865,000 New Zealanders born since 1999 
can expect to live to 2090 and many of the 292,000 
born since 2008 can expect to live into the 22nd 
century, with a few, matching Peg, alive in 2118.126
It is difficult to look forward to this extent. In 2014 it is 
rare to attempt forecasts beyond 2050 and forecasts 
often reach only to 2035 – the equivalent of looking 
back no further than to 1980 or to 1995.
The caution is not misplaced of course. It is possible  
to extrapolate but the results can be misleading. 
The 1946 population committee was not sure the 
population growth rate would rise above its 1944 level. 
The unanticipated growth over the next two decades 
led the forecasters of the 1960s to overestimate growth 
– a 2001 population of five million was expected.127
What are today’s orthodoxies and how robust are they?
Diversity
The census confirmed New Zealand’s increasingly 
diverse population – not something new, but something 
that is assuming new dimensions and meanings. 
The diversity is the product of two long-established 
migration flows: immigration and circulation of citizens 
of other countries, and emigration and circulation of  
New Zealanders. Both will persist. An overlap in ethnic 
affiliation, already a marked feature of younger age 
groups, and a secular majority living alongside 
adherents of a variety of faiths and cultural practices, 
will both characterize the 21st century.
Population change
The trend of an ageing population is unlikely to be 
reversed. But consider the following possibilities which 
could intensify the ageing process:
• The ageing population is supplemented by an older 
migrant group which after a couple of decades join 
the aged population, increasing their proportion in 
the total population.
• The ‘demographic dividend’ of a youthful Māori and 
Pasifika population evaporates because of substantial 
migration (and relative absence of remittances) 
to Australia.
On the other hand in the long, long term, the baby boom 
‘pig in the python’ will pass. While in 2026 there will be 
more people over 65 than under 14, between 2060 and 
2070 the last ‘baby boomers’, those born in 1964, will 
be over 100. What will the population pyramid look like 
then?
Tangata whenua
Māori have a long history of adaptation, beginning 
with their settling of Aotearoa around 750 years 
ago, through colonisation and the post-WWII rural-
urban migration. The changes foreshadowed by the 
2013 census present new but not unprecedented 
opportunities and challenges.
Ongoing ethnic diversification means that the old idea 
of ‘two peoples, one nation’ will be less relevant. The 
relationship between Māori and Pākehā may come to 
matter less than those forged with more recent settler 
groups, particularly from Asian countries.
Like other New Zealanders, Māori will become more 
transnational, with family and financial roots in multiple 
places. Collective institutions will need to be supple to 
take account of these diverse realities and to maintain 
connections between the Māori diaspora and their 
homeland communities.
The growth of Māori-owned assets alongside 
persisting socio-economic inequality challenges Māori 
and the nation as a whole to minimize the distance 
between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ by expanding the 
Māori middle-class and reducing the number in poor 
circumstances.
Migration
Many people assume that when New Zealanders leave 
they will not return. But overall this is not the case 
– there are always New Zealanders returning after a 
lengthy absence overseas. In the year ended March 
2014, for example, 27,345 New Zealand citizens arrived 
in the country who had been away for 12 months or 
more – the largest number since the year ended March 
1991 (29,575).128
Given the 650,000 or so New Zealanders in Australia 
in 2013 (15 percent of the New Zealand-residing 
population) the implications for the persistence of such 
return migration are immense. And that does not take 
account of the fact that 23 million Australians have 
unrestricted right of access to the New Zealand labour 
market and New Zealand welfare entitlements.
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Even without surges from such sources, net  
migration will likely continue to make a contribution 
to population growth. Indeed, this contribution is likely 
to increase, relative to the contribution from natural 
increase from the mid-2030s, as the gap between 
births and deaths shrinks with rising numbers of 
deaths and falling birth rates.129
New Zealand is firmly on the horizon of increasing 
numbers of relatively wealthy migrants from Asian 
countries, even though the United States, Canada and 
Australia are preferred destinations. Those migrants 
look for quality of life, not income earning opportunities. 
This will continue to be the case well into the 21st 
century.
Households and families
Household living arrangements will be sensitive to 
changes in age structure. Projections of household 
types in ageing populations show increases in couples 
without children households and single person 
households. In Tauranga City, for example, household 
projections based on 2001 census data for couple only 
and single person households showed increases of 183 
percent and 205 percent respectively between 2001 
and 2051, compared with an overall increase in number 
of households of 155 percent.130 Households comprising 
couples with children and sole parent households 
increased by only 105 percent by comparison. The 
‘stability’ in types of household living arrangements 
between 2001 and 2013 will not necessarily continue, 
especially not at the regional level.
Regional variation
New Zealand was 86 percent urban at the 2013 census, 
a proportion that has increased only slightly since 1981. 
We assume that level of urbanisation will persist, 
possibly even increase. But the Canterbury earthquakes 
showed that urban areas are very susceptible to 
environmental shocks – and almost all New Zealand’s 
towns and cities are in high hazard areas (whether 
the hazard be earthquake, flood, tsunami or volcanic 
activity). The Canterbury quakes produced significant 
population movements – within Canterbury in 
particular, but also beyond.
Other environmental shocks could have the same effect, 
not just in New Zealand. The tsunami in Samoa in 2011 
is one such instance. A long-term effect of changes 
in atoll environments in Kiribati (current population 
around 100,000) and Tuvalu (current population around 
10,000), countries which already have some privileged 
access to New Zealand residence through small Pacific 
Access Category (PAC) quotas, could be accelerated 
emigration to New Zealand. Most of the new migrants 
from these countries end up in New Zealand’s  
urban centres.
Work
Ongoing changes both to where people work (location, 
industry and profession) and how they work (a range of 
employment contracts and circumstances) reflect global 
dynamics as industrial production moves to new sites or 
technology redefines the nature of work. There are also 
local drivers, such as the growing significance of the 
service industries for employment. Work remains an 
important influence on identity, income and options  
for individuals and families and there are very different 
outcomes depending on ethnicity, education and location.
Melanesians – NiVanuatu, Solomon Islander, Papua New 
Guinean – may be a significant new source of migrants. 
Since 2007 Vanuatu has been the largest supplier  
of Pacific seasonal workers for the horticulture and 
viticulture industries. There will be one million more 
young Melanesian workers aged 15–24 years in 2050 
than in 2013; New Zealand will have 20,000 fewer 
workers in that age group in 2050.131
Haere ra
New Zealand may be a quintessential 21st century 
society: more open than most to flows of goods, capital, 
information and labour across our international border. 
Moreover, today’s New Zealanders inherit strong 
traditions of freedom and self-government. We are a 
fortunate country, with a reasonable natural resource 
endowment, a small, well-educated, reasonably well-off 
population (by global standards), an increasingly diverse 
society that is endeavouring to accommodate that 
diversity, and a society better adjusted to environmental 
variability than some other societies in more stable 
natural environments.
This audit, coming on the back of the latest census, is 
intended to contribute to that ‘fortune’ by making us 
mindful of the opportunities and challenges we face  
over the next decades.
Ko te pae tata 
whakamaua, kia tīnā 
Ko te pae tāwhiti 
whaia, kia tata
“Secure the horizons that are close to hand and  
pursue the more distant horizons so that they  
may become close”.
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